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Key Findings
n Turkey implemented the world's first full
pharmaceutical track and trace system.
n Its success depended on 4 factors:
* Political determination
* Industry incentives
* Reimbursement linked to verified dispensing
* Flexible implementation
Key Implications
n Policy makers should perform a systemic analysis
of market, political, economic, technical, and legal
factors before implementing any pharmaceutical
track and trace system.
n To achieve the intended outcomes, system design
must align with the goals of implementation (e.g., to
tackle fraud, reduce falsified medicine, minimize
shortages). The system must be feasible in the
local political and economic context.
ABSTRACT
Background: Track and trace systems are increasingly being
implemented as a technological solution to secure pharmaceutical
supply chains. Turkey was the first country to implement a full
pharmaceutical track and trace system throughout the entire reg-
ulated domestic supply chain. This article explores the emergence
and functioning of this system and the consequences for substan-
dard and falsified medicine with a focus on the underlying politi-
cal and economic factors.
Methods: This study uses an explanatory case study approach
that combined interviews with purposefully selected key infor-
mants and document analyses.
Results: The main drivers for implementing the pharmaceutical
track and trace system in Turkey centered on the elimination of
reimbursement fraud and the prevention of falsified medicine in
the regulated supply chain. Although stakeholders experienced
both physical and software-related problems in implementation,
the alignment of incentives of all stakeholders with the power of
the state, along with leeway for adaptations, ultimately resulted
in a successful process. This track and trace system provides a
clean regulated supply chain, minimizes reimbursement fraud,
facilitates fast market recalls, and can flag likely medicine
shortages. Staff previously engaged in pharmacy inspections
now concentrate on ensuring production quality, which reduces
the risk of substandard medicines.
Conclusions: In Turkey, 4 factors drove the successful implemen-
tation of pharmaceutical track and trace: the political determina-
tion to eliminate reimbursement fraud, a large pharmaceutical
market dominated by a single payer, medicine reimbursement
being contingent on verified dispensing and prescription, and
flexibility to adapt the system according to the needs of stake-
holders during implementation.
INTRODUCTION
Track and trace systems are logistical technologiesthat enable localizing and following a product
throughout a supply chain1; they are used in many sec-
tors, including aviation and retailing.1,2 In 2012, Turkey
became the first country in theworld to implement a full
track and trace system to secure its domestic pharmaceu-
tical supply chain. A growing number of countries are
now following suit. Argentina and Saudi Arabia are
among the countries that have already put such a system
in place, while other countries, including China, the
United States, and European Union (EU)member states,
are currently in the process of implementation.3–5
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For pharmaceuticals, 2 track and trace systems
dominate. The first, known as a “point-of-
dispense check” system, validates medicine
packages at the points where they are dispensed
to patients (e.g., pharmacy or hospital) with the
code assigned during the manufacturing process.
Other transactions (e.g., between wholesalers
and distributors) are not systematically recorded.3
The European Medicines Verification System,
implemented by the EU in February 2019 as part
of the Falsified Medicines Directive, provides an
example.4 This system allows for verifying the au-
thenticity of the product, but not for tracking the
product throughout the supply chain.1,4 The sec-
ond track and trace system, often referred to as
full track and trace, validates a medicine package
at every stage of its journey through the supply
chain. This system is in use in Turkey.4 Although
the full track and trace system is more complex to
implement, it provides additional potential bene-
fits to those of the point-of-dispense check system.
These benefits include real-time tracking through-
out the entire supply chain, stockmanagement for
timely detection and prevention of stock-outs, tar-
geted product recalls, and reduction of reimburse-
ment fraud, theft, and medication errors.1,6–9
Recent studies show that the opportunity to
enter the pharmaceutical supply chain differs be-
tween substandard and falsified medicines. Sub-
standardmedicines,which are defined as authorized
products that fail to meet quality standards, enter
the supply chain throughmanufacturers whomight
sacrifice quality to maximize profits.10,11 Falsified
medicines, which have a deliberately misrepre-
sented identity, composition, or source, are often in-
troduced by criminalswho see amarket opportunity
when shortages of quality and affordable medicine
occur in the regulatedmarket.9,11
Turkey began with a point-of-dispense check
system known as Ilaç Takip Sistemi (ITS) in 2010,
before introducing full track and trace in 2012.3,8
From the start, all medicines sold in Turkey had
to be equipped with a DataMatrix code, which
is a 2-dimensional barcode. A DataMatrix code
contains information on the Global Trade Item
Number, a serial number, an expiration date, and
a batch number, which enables tracking the histo-
ry and location of each medicine through the sup-
ply chain.12,13
Implementing New Technologies
In this case study, we draw upon insights into the
implementation of new technologies, which are
based upon the rich literature on technological in-
novation. First, technological changes do not take
place in a vacuum; they are embedded in dynamic
and complex systems and are shaped by social, po-
litical, and economic factors. Therefore, when an-
alyzing the implementation and functioning of
new technologies, one must consider the context
in which they are embedded.14–16
Second, initiation or successful implementa-
tion of technological change is often contingent
on the determination of key actors to solve a per-
ceived problem. The process of problematization
and the emergence of a relative consensus about
the nature of a problem are important first steps
in aligning the incentives of all parties playing a
key role in implementing the new technology.17
Third, implementation and innovation are in-
timately and reciprocally connected, whichmeans
that innovations transform during implementa-
tion.18 As a result, the technology that ultimately
gets implemented often deviates from the initial
plan. These adaptations, which are often omitted
in retrospective accounts about the success of a
technology, enable a certain system or technology
to operate successfully within its specific context.
Overlooking these adaptations undermines the
successful reproducibility of technological innova-
tions. In addition, adaptations enable different
actors to assign different roles to the technology
that are not limited to the official function of the
technology.19 This results in unforeseen outcomes
of the technology that are valuable to capture in
order to reach its full potential.
Although Turkey was the first country to im-
plement a full track and trace system, neither
how the country achieved this significant feat nor
what made it possible has been closely investigat-
ed. The aim of this study was to gain insight into
political and economic factors that drove the im-
plementation of the pharmaceutical track and
trace system in Turkey. We paid special attention
to the consequences of the system for substandard
and falsified medicines. Insights from our study
may provide valuable knowledge to other coun-
tries aiming to implement pharmaceutical track
and trace systems and may contribute to the un-
derstanding of implementing large technological
systems in the health sector.
METHODS
Study Design
For this qualitative case study, document analysis
and semistructured interviews were carried out.
We used an explanatory case study approach, the
main purpose of which was “to explain how and
why some conditions came to be.”20 Such an
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approach allows for investigating underlying fac-
tors that are often too complex to be captured by
surveys or other quantitative measures alone.21
We believe that a detailed understanding of the im-
plementation and adaptation of the pharmaceutical
track and trace system will provide valuable in-
sights into the complexities involved in implement-
ing such large-scale health technologies.
Study Participants
The study participants were 16 purposefully se-
lected key informants. Selection was based on
their knowledge and expertise in political and eco-
nomic factors influencing the emergence, imple-
mentation, and functioning of ITS. The aim of
purposeful sampling is to increase depth and
richness of the collected data by identifying and
selecting information-rich cases from different
perspectives.22,23 We sought to involve stake-
holders across the supply chain, together with in-
dependent experts, to achieve a comprehensive
evaluation of the pharmaceutical track and trace
system in Turkey. Backgrounds of study partici-
pants are shown in the Table.
Data Collection Methods
To prepare for interviews and to triangulate find-
ings, we reviewed relevant policy documents that
helped us understand the emergence, implementa-
tion, and functioning of ITS, such as regulations on
recall,24 labelling, package leaflets, tracing of hu-
manmedicinal products,13,25 and ITS guidelines.26
Semistructured interviews were carried out
between March and April 2018, using an
interview guide (Supplement 1). We obtained
written informed consent for interviews and
requested permission to audio-record them.
Three respondents refused to be audio-recorded,
so detailed notes were instead taken during these
interviews. Participants were anonymized using
identification numbers that were stored separately
from the study data. Interviews were conducted
both in English and Turkish and lasted between
60 and 120 minutes.
Data Analysis Methods
A constant comparative method of analysis was
carried out. This method involves an iterative pro-
cess, in which newly collected data in the form of
interviews were triangulated with existing data
from previous interviews, studies, or reports ob-
tained during literature research to inform subse-
quent data collection and verify findings.27 First,
the semistructured interviews were recorded
and transcribed verbatim. Then, if necessary, they
were translated into English. Interviewswere cod-
ed using a coding structure jointly developed by
the research team. This structure was based on
political and economic factors enabling market
opportunities for substandard and falsified medi-
cine, along with factors facilitating or obstructing
the implementation and functioning of track and
trace systems (Supplement 2). Emerging themes
and the analysis were discussed during 6 weekly
team meetings, until consensus was reached.
NVivo (12.0.0) was used as the qualitative data
analysis software.
RESULTS
Historical Developments and Pricing Policies
To provide the contextual background, we asked
participants to reflect on the historical develop-
ments of the health sector and the pharmaceutical
industry in Turkey. Until the early 2000s, Turkey
experienced several problems in the health sector,
including insufficient insurance coverage, poor
health outcomes such as life expectancy and ma-
ternal mortality, and relatively low governmental
health expenditure.
In addition, Turkey had 3 state institutions,
which are known by their Turkish abbreviations
SSK, BAG-KUR, and Emekli Sandıgı, providing
health insurance to different employment-based
groups. These institutions operated indepen-
dently, which resulted in high fragmentation of
service provision and restricted access to health
services28,29:
TABLE. Participants in the Qualitative Case Study of
the Pharmaceutical Track and Trace System in
Turkey, N=16
Participant Category No.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers 2
Wholesalers 1
Health care providers 1
Ministry of Health/regulators 3
Technical agencies
International organizations 1
Software developers 2
Associations/unions 3
Reimbursement agencies 2
Academics 1
Understanding
of the
implementation
and adaptation
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pharmaceutical
track and trace
systemwill
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complexities of
implementing
such large-scale
health
technologies.
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At that time about half of Turkey’s population, 50 per-
cent was covered under SSK, and the number of hospi-
tals those people could use was only 120. For the whole
of Turkey, can you imagine? Half of the population in
Turkey is doomed to only 120 hospitals.—Academic
After the national elections in 2002, the Jus-
tice and Development Party came into power in
Turkey. This was the first time a political party
with religious roots came into power as a single-
party government since the establishment of
the constitutionally secular Republic of Turkey.
Therefore, they had to establish political legitima-
cy among their citizens and the international
community. The government made a strong com-
mitment to universal health coverage as a way of
establishing political legitimacy among the coun-
try’s citizens and in the international community.
The government subsequently introduced the
Health Transformation Program in 2003 with the
aim to increase insurance coverage and financial
risk protection.
After 2006, the governmentmerged the 3 state
institutions providing health insurance to form
a single-payer institution, called Sosyal Güvenlik
Kurumu (SGK).30 Insurance coverage provided by
SGK increased access to health services in Turkey
considerably, resulting in a significant increase in
public health expenditure. In response, the gov-
ernment introduced price-cutting measures, such
as reference pricing in 2004 and global budgeting
between 2010 and 2012. Despite these measures,
manufacturers continued to supply the Turkish
market, mainly because increased access to health
services increased the overall volume of sales, cre-
ating a substantial pharmaceutical market that
manufacturers were not willing to give up:
There was not such a thing as convincing. The state is
not obliged to convince. The customer is king. “I pay the
money; I determine the conditions.” Turkey has such an
advantage. I buy more than 80 percent of the market.
They say: “If you are willing to give [medicines] under
these conditions, then you can give them. Otherwise,
I’m sorry, go sell them in another country, don’t sell
them to me.”—Multinational manufacturer
Respondents were asked if downward price
pressures incentivized manufacturers to cut cor-
ners, resulting in substandard medicines. Both
manufacturers and the Ministry of Health (MOH)
emphasized that the production or import of sub-
standard medicine in the Turkish market was very
unlikely because Turkey has well-defined legisla-
tion and regulations, including Good Manufact-
uring Practices (GMP), inspections, laboratories,
and a pharmaceutical track and trace system.
According to respondents, this strong regulatory
framework minimized the possibility of substan-
dard products on themarket, while enabling rapid
detection.
Pharmaceutical Track and Trace
An MOH official explained that before the intro-
duction of the pharmaceutical track and trace
system in 2010, quality assurance of medical pro-
ducts was mainly based on market surveillance
and inspections. When pharmacists, health pro-
fessionals, or others reported suspicions about a
product, the MOH might sample that product for
testing. This largely reactive system was time and
resource intensive.
Despite the successful pricing policies to re-
duce medicine prices, the state experienced signif-
icant losses due to fraud around 2007. Although
falsification and theft contributed to these losses,
all respondents indicated that the main reason for
the implementation of the pharmaceutical track
and trace system in Turkey (i.e., ITS) was the pres-
ence of “reimbursement fraud” or “barcode scam-
ming.” Prior to ITS, pharmacies had to cut out the
barcode of each product sold and put it behind the
invoice. The invoicewould then be sent to SGK for
reimbursement. However, this system was vul-
nerable to fraud, as seen in the following example:
I know your national identity number. I am a doctor
and I am writing the prescription to you, but you don’t
know that I am writing it. I give this prescription to the
pharmacy. And the pharmacy doesn’t sell the drug but
sells the barcode. It prints the barcode on the offset and
sticks that barcode behind that prescription or the in-
voice and sends it to SGK. Takes the money, but there is
no transaction or trade. I mean, nobody sells anything,
but gets the money from SGK. It is not a fraud to people;
it is a fraud to the government. —Technical agency
official
Respondents mentioned the existence of “print-
ing houses” exclusively printing these falsified bar-
codes to be reimbursed by SGK. This fraud was
estimated to account for US$1 billion annually.31,32
Implementation of ITS
To prevent reimbursement fraud, the government
decided to implement ITS. The first discussions
on ITS occurred in 2007, but it took 3 years to
convince and prepare stakeholders. The imple-
mentation took place in 2 phases to reduce imple-
mentation problems. A few months prior to the
implementation of the first phase, a short pilot
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study was done with a small number of pharma-
cies. Then, phase 1, which focused on the manu-
facturers and pharmacists, was introduced in
2010. These 2 stakeholder groups, which are the
front- and tail-end of the pharmaceutical supply
chain, were obliged to make sales notifications,
but wholesalers were not yet included in the sys-
tem. Respondents mentioned that the phase 1 sys-
tem, which corresponded to a point-of-dispense
check system, remained vulnerable to introduc-
tion of falsified medicines at points in the supply
chain where transactions were not tracked.
The initial implementation of phase 1 was
problematic because of the way in which the soft-
ware was developed. A single software engineer
who had little experience in building enterprise
systems was given the responsibility to create the
software. The system crashed shortly after phase
1 was launched in 2010 and the system then had
to be rebuilt from scratch by another person.
Respondents indicated that the political will and
determination of senior political figures were the
main driving forces for this project to succeed:
The undersecretary general called me to SGK, I was
shopping in my sportswear at that time. He told me:
“Okay, it is not important, come here!” I was running
in the hall of SGK and I opened the door of the meeting
room. I was sweating, in sportswear and I saw that
two ministers, two undersecretary generals, two vice
presidents, a lot of big guys were in the meeting room. I
was shocked. The undersecretary general said: “This is
the person I mentioned.” I sat between two ministers
and they asked: “The system crashed, what should we
do?” I told them: “First, accept it. In front of the news,
in front of the media, first accept it and postpone it.”
They said: “This is politics, we cannot do that. You
have 10 days, please make it work.” This is the Eastern
culture.—Technical agency official
Phase 2 was implemented in 2012. It can be
described as full track and trace, encompassing all
actors within the domestic regulated supply chain.
It was based on cross-checking movements of a
product between each actor by comparing sales
and purchase notifications. After phase 2, mainte-
nance and development of ITS came under the re-
sponsibility of another company and MOH. The
data on themedicines were pooled in a centralized
database managed by the MOH. A schematic rep-
resentation of the ITS workflow is shown in the
Figure.
Reaction to ITS
When ITS was first introduced, the expectations
on its feasibility varied widely between different
actors. Government institutions, including MOH
and SGK, were convinced that the system would
succeed, and that it would cut fraud and thus
expenses in the national health system. Manu-
FIGURE. Simplified Schematic Representation of the Workflow of the Full Pharmaceutical Track and Trace
System Used in Turkey
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facturers, however, did not think it was feasible.
No other country had successfully executed na-
tional track and trace, and manufacturers were
especially skeptical that it could be achieved in
the very limited timeframe envisaged by Turkish
politicians:
There was a thing like: “Well, it won’t be implemented
here anyways. It will fail. Let’s act as if we are comply-
ing to it, it won’t work anyways.” —Multinational
manufacturer
Industry was unhappy about having to bear
the costs of compliance. One manufacturer estimat-
ed that his company invested around US$5 million
in adding track and trace to their production
and distribution flow, and that amount did
not account for production losses. Another
manufacturer said that the costs were around
US$100,000 per conveyor belt. An additional
concern of manufacturers was the lack of ade-
quate equipment:
We invited the Germans and Italians, who were good in
machines. We talked to them. When we first bought it,
we were buying dreams. (. . .) The ones who were able
to convince you the most, you picked, because there was
nobody that could show you [how it would work]. —
Multinational manufacturer
Thewholesaler, who shared these initial doubts
and skepticism, explained that they invested
around 100 million Turkish Liras to implement
this system across Turkey.
The merger of the 3 state payers into a single
health insurer provided the state with consolidat-
ed buying power covering around 95% of the
market, which was sufficient to incentivize the
pharmaceutical industry to implement the system.
Manufacturers also saw a benefit in reducing ac-
cess to themarket for medicine falsifiers, thus pro-
tecting income and value.
The pharmacists included in our study indicat-
ed that they were most concerned about the in-
creased workload because each product had to be
individually scanned. Forgetting to do so could
have serious consequences for the pharmacists
during inspections.
With all these different interests, the challenge
of aligning personal and institutional incentives
was far greater than any technological challenge,
as an MOH official pointed out:
I can get four people from India who can build this
system in a short amount of time. The most crucial
part is aligning all stakeholders with the support of
the government.—MOH official
Implementation and Adaptation
Despite the phased implementation, stakeholders
experienced many implementation problems,
both physical and software related. In phase 1,
issues with software development and realistic
planning of the implementation process were expe-
rienced by manufacturers, wholesalers, and phar-
macists. Additionally, a manufacturer explained
that physically adapting the production lines to print
and scan DataMatrix codes turned out to be
challenging:
We experienced a lot of problems. The ink got wiped be-
cause it did not dry properly. Also, when the conveyor
belt was a bit skewed, the scanner could not read the
DataMatrix [code].—Multinational manufacturer
Existing production lines in factories were not
designed to be adapted, while new production
lines were not yet developed. In addition, manu-
facturers experienced problems with sales notifi-
cations. Originally, the DataMatrix code on each
secondary medicine package—the packaging
enclosing the primary packages (e.g., blister or
bottle)—had to be scanned individually, which
took time and resources. Therefore, manufac-
turers introduced a “minimum-order-quantity
system,” in which wholesalers were obliged to
purchase medicines in fixed amounts. This system
allowedmanufacturers to scan the DataMatrix code
on the tertiary packaging (i.e., the shipping-level
packaging surrounding the secondary packaging).
Similarly, changes were made to logistic units.25
The industry realized that the serial shipping con-
tainer codewasmore appropriate than the serialized
global trade item number, whichMOH initially pro-
posed. However, respondents pointed out thatMOH
was willing to modify the system accordingly:
The things that the authority sees from above and the real-
ity wework in at the operational level are different. . . .We
realized these things by experience. Therefore, things that
were written down in theory evolved towards the real-
ity of daily life in the end. Otherwise, if they did not
change, if the ministry of health did not take our feed-
back into consideration, this system would be a non-
operative system.—Multinational manufacturer
The wholesaler experienced similar implemen-
tation problems. Scanning the DataMatrix codes
and adapting conveyor belts proved challenging.
Also, staff needed to be trained to use the system
appropriately. Most of the problems experienced
by pharmacists related to software malfunction.
When the system was inaccessible, pharmacists
were not able to sell their products to patients. The
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problems were more acute in hospitals, where
scanners were often in short supply. Additionally,
hospitals buying common medicines in bulk found
it difficult to scan individual prescriptions because
the DataMatrix codes were not affixed to the
packages of pills given to the patients but were
only on the outer (or secondary) packaging, which
was often thrown away before medicines were dis-
pensed as individual patient prescriptions. As a result,
hospitals were making consumption notifications
instead of sales notifications.26
Although MOH was open and collaborative in
adapting the system according to the needs of
those involved during implementation, solving
practical problems remained largely the responsi-
bility of stakeholders.
Outcomes of ITS
Respondents indicated that implementing ITS has
had 5 main positive outcomes. First, reimburse-
ment fraud is highly unlikely to happen in the cur-
rent system. Successful fraud would require the
participation of a long chain of people, raising the
risk and reducing the reward for fraudsters.
Reimbursement agency officials added that fraud
cannot be reduced to zero but only minimized to
a certain level, which is believed to have currently
been achieved.
Second, ITS has largely eliminated falsified
medicines in the regulated domestic supply chain.
According to respondents, it is currently close to
impossible to sell falsified medicines to patients in
pharmacies and get reimbursement from SGK.
Medicines cannot be “injected” into the supply
chain at any stage other than by the manufacturer
or importer. The only possibility for selling falsi-
fied products to patients is through out-of-pocket
payments. However, since SGK provides compre-
hensive coverage to almost the entire population,
citizens have no incentive to look outside the
regulated supply chain or buy products out-of-
pocket. Respondents underlined that Turkey’s
health financing system, which reimburses phar-
macists for verified dispensing and prescriptions,
is central to the success of ITS. If pharmacists do
not scan the DataMatrix code at dispensing, which
serves to verify the authenticity of the product,
SGK will not pay them for the product. In the
case of a prescription medicine, SGK also verifies
the authenticated product with the patient’s med-
ical prescription before paying the pharmacist.
Third, respondents said that ITS has optimized
the recall process for products that are degraded or
show unwanted side effects. ITS enables quick and
targeted recalls of specific products. The sale of
suspect products can also be blocked within the
system byMOH officials,24 which prevents further
dissemination of poor-quality medicines and po-
tentially significantly reduces public health harm
caused by them.
Fourth, a mobile application of ITS, which was
launched in 2014, allows citizens to scan the
DataMatrix code of products. Citizens can imme-
diately check the legitimacy of the product and ob-
tain additional information, such as the expiry
date, price, and recall status. Also, side effects can
be entered in the application, which facilitates the
collection of pharmacovigilance data.
Fifth, since ITS registers sales throughout the
supply chain and eventual dispensing by outlet,
the system allows for closemonitoring ofmedicine
stocks by health authorities, as well as providing
inventory control for manufacturers, wholesalers,
and pharmacies.
Although ITS has had many positive out-
comes, respondents noted that ITS does not guar-
antee product quality. If a product has poor
quality at manufacture or import, it will continue
through the supply chain; careful tracking also
does not protect against degradation. However,
by reducing time spent on pharmacy inspections,
ITS allows the transfer of human resources to oth-
er quality assurance functions:
Before ITS, we had 3,000 inspectors [checking pharma-
cies]. After ITS, we have 100 inspectors. The other ones,
we didn’t fire them, the other ones are used inside a new
department which is GMP compliance, GDP [Good
Distribution Practice] compliance and they are taking
more samples from the market. They are going to the
manufacturing sites and inspecting for substandard
products. They are inspecting the active pharmaceuti-
cal ingredients. Now, they have time to inspect these
things.—Technical agency official
Although quantitative data are not available,
respondents reported that the tracking capability
of ITS in combination with sufficient and qualified
human resources has significantly increased the
possibility of detecting substandard and falsified
medicine.
Future Adaptations to ITS
Respondents suggested 2 potential improvements
to ITS. First, the scope of products given a
DataMatrix code should increase. Currently, al-
most all medicines under the responsibility of
MOH are obliged to carry a DataMatrix code, and
internet sales are prohibited. However, some
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optimizing recalls,
empowering
consumers, and
matching supply
to demand.
ITS could be
improved by
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products and by
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system to prevent
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shortages.
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products, such as intravenous and radiopharma-
ceutical products, active pharmaceutical ingredi-
ents, and personalized medicines compounded in
the pharmacy, are excluded from the DataMatrix
code requirement. In addition, products such as
vitamins and dietary supplements that are over-
seen by the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and
Livestock are not included in ITS. Respondents
pointed out that falsification currently takes place
with over-the-counter products rather than pre-
scription medicine because inspections and regu-
lations are less rigid. Although the majority of
patients are aware that quality cannot be guaran-
teed, some products such as weight loss products,
sexual products, or dietary supplements are some-
times purchased on the internet.
Second, an MOH official mentioned that ITS
data could be used more effectively to prevent
shortages and stock-outs. Although the current
system is largely reactive,MOH aims to implement
a proactive alarm system that provides a warning
when the supply of a certain product goes below
a specific threshold in a particular area. Such
warnings will enable the system to procure medi-
cine more rapidly and to prevent drug shortages
more successfully.
DISCUSSION
Several countries and regions have attempted to
introduce full pharmaceutical track and trace sys-
tems. Turkey was the first to succeed. This study
aimed to elucidate the factors underpinning the
success of this technological innovation. We find
that the drivers of success were more political and
economic than technological.
China, which has considerable experience and
capability in implementing large technological
programs in its health sector, suspended plans to
introduce pharmaceutical track and trace in 2016
after facing considerable resistance frommedicine
manufacturers. Industry was concerned that the
linear barcode system proposed instead of a
DataMatrix code would create a large footprint
on the medicine package to capture the required
data. Further, there was concern that the require-
ment that all barcodes be printed only by the gov-
ernment would result in a burdensome and costly
procedure for manufacturers.33 As discussions
with stakeholders continue, the target data for im-
plementation has been pushed back to 2022.
The United States provides another example in
which difficulty in adequately aligning incentives
for all key actors has led to slow adoption of full
traceability. Industry has not fully complied with
the phased implementation foreseen in the 2013
Drug Supply Chain Security Act. Implementation
of the act is expected to take a full decade.4,34
How was Turkey, a middle-income country
with no great tradition of technological innova-
tion, able to succeed where others stumbled? The
most critical element was the combination of a
widely recognized problem and political determi-
nation to solve it.
The winners of the 2002 elections in Turkey
sought to establish political legitimacy through
programs that delivered benefits to a broad swath
of citizens. One of these benefits was universal
health coverage delivered through a single-payer
state institution. When high levels of fraud threat-
ened the sustainability of this coverage, politicians
threw their weight behind an ambitious technolog-
ical solutionwithin an improbably tight timeframe.
The state controlled access to a large and
expanding pharmaceutical market, and manufac-
turers who wanted to sell into that market had to
play ball. A generous benefit package greatly re-
duced out-of-pocket spending on medicines.
Together with a prohibition on internet sales of
prescription products, the benefit package re-
moved any incentive for patients to purchase pro-
ducts from the unregulated supply chain. At the
same time, the reimbursement system obliged
pharmacists to bow to the will of the government;
if they did not, they would not get paid. Together,
these factors allowed for the widespread adoption
of the system.
The successful implementation of the system
was underpinned by another key factor: a willing-
ness of the government, which was driving the
process, to support flexible and adaptive solutions
to problems identified during implementation.
These work-arounds were not just technical; like
all adaptive implementation, they also had a social
component, encompassing human actions and
relations.18 The Turkish state mainly focused on
facilitating the social component, while other
actors took responsibility for implementing the
technical components of ITS.
Turkey’s centralized database allowed for veri-
fying reimbursement data because its track and
trace database was linked to the database of SGK,
the single-payer state-owned reimbursement
agency. This process enabled reducing fraud dra-
matically.8 Centralized databases rely heavily on
the presence of sufficient technical capacity at the
central level. If this capacity is lacking, outsourcing
the development of the system to a software com-
pany, as in Turkey, might solve the problem, as
long as security and privacy concerns of
Howwas Turkey, a
middle-income
country with no
great tradition of
technological
innovation, able
to succeedwhere
others stumbled?
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stakeholders are addressed.4 In environments
without political power emerging from a single-
payer institution, the reimbursement landscape
might be fragmented. The reimbursement agen-
cies within a fragmented market, as well as the
pharmaceutical industry, might oppose sharing
and centralizing their competitive data more
strongly.35,36 In these circumstances, setting up a
distributed database that gives stakeholders more
authority over their data might be more feasible.
However, disadvantages of distributed databases
include difficulty in governing and adapting the
system because ownership of the data is not
centralized.4,8
To our knowledge, this study is the first to
evaluate the emergence, implementation, and
outcomes of ITS in Turkey, while focusing on the
underlying political and economic factors. Since
Turkey is the first country in the world to imple-
ment a full track and trace system, the implica-
tions of this study might be of particular interest
to countries aiming to implement similar track
and trace systems, including the EU member
states, China, and the United States.
Limitations
The findings of this qualitative study could be
strengthened through triangulation with quanti-
tative data on the quality of medicine in the
Turkish pharmaceutical market, the implementa-
tion costs of ITS, and the effect of ITS on public
health. However, attempts to verify estimates pro-
vided by respondents with quantitative data from
government or other formal sources proved un-
successful. Future studies on the cost effectiveness
of ITS might provide valuable insights.
For some categories of participants, we inter-
viewed only a single key informant. However, tri-
angulation of data provided by respondents from
different sectors (e.g., manufacturers, whole-
salers, technical agencies) in combination with
further triangulation from literature increases our
confidence in the validity and reliability of our
study data.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The outcomes of our study show 3 main implica-
tions for countries aiming to implement pharma-
ceutical track and trace systems.
First, a track and trace system should be seen
as a means to an end, rather than a goal in itself.
To function, it must be underpinned by well-
defined legislation and regulatory capacity, in-
cluding laboratories and frequent GMP and GDP
inspections. Without these, there is a risk of “gar-
bage in equals garbage out.” In that case, track and
trace may simply deliver a secure supply chain for
poor-quality products.
Second, the incentives of all the stakeholders
need to be aligned to successfully adopt the system.
The role of the state should not be underestimated.
It should both facilitate the implementation process
with its political power, as well as provide sufficient
leeway to adapt the system according to the needs
of stakeholders. Countries lacking powerful politi-
cal leadership might expect greater resistance to
implementing pharmaceutical track and trace sys-
tems from stakeholders. This resistance is especially
likely from stakeholders that bear the burden of
upfront investment in technology and those that
might benefit from gaps in the supply chain.
Third, countries/regions should aim to imple-
ment a full track and trace system. Although the
benefits of track and trace systems are not univer-
sal and rely on the nature of the pharmaceutical
system of the implementing country, point-of-
dispense check systems, which exclude wholesa-
lers and other middlemen, preclude some of the
more important benefits of full track and trace.
They do not provide data to flag regional
shortages. Further, because they do not allow for
traceability of products throughout the supply
chain, such partial systems limit the ability to re-
call products. As a result, falsified products might
circulate in a market for months without detec-
tion.3 This situation is especially true in the EU’s
complex single-market supply chains. Although
the European Medicines Verification System has
added an antitampering device to the outer medi-
cine package to prevent unlawful repackaging,
nonreimbursed or over-the-counter products will
remain vulnerable to falsification. Most impor-
tantly, in EU member states lacking closed supply
chains, patients might buy products online that
are less likely to be verified and may even be ex-
cluded from verification. Although accreditations,
domain name verifications, and logos for online
pharmacies exist, their effectiveness can still be
undermined by a lack of consumer awareness,
vulnerability to misuse, unavailability of certain
types of products at accredited online pharmacies,
and the attractiveness of cheaper options.37–39
CONCLUSION
Although track and trace systems are sometimes
presented as reproduceable technical solutions to
quality assurance in the supply chain, this study
shows that the main drivers of success for ITS in
The implications of
this studymightbe
particularly
interesting for
countries aiming
to implement
track and trace
systems, including
the EUmember
states, China, and
the United States.
Pharmaceutical Track and Trace System Implementation in Turkey www.ghspjournal.org
Global Health: Science and Practice 2020 | Volume 8 | Number 3 9
Turkey were highly dependent on the presence of
a specific set of circumstances. These included po-
litical determination induced by reimbursement
fraud, political power emerging from a single-
payer institution that generated a substantial
pharmaceutical market, reimbursement for veri-
fied dispensing and prescription, and flexibility to
adapt the system according to the needs of stake-
holders during implementation.
Despite ITS’s success in providing a clean regu-
lated supply chain, it represents only part of the
solution. ITS can only operate effectively if it is
embedded in a pharmaceutical market where all
legislative and regulatory components are in
place.
Acknowledgments: The team is grateful to all interviewees participating
in this study. We thank Adina-Loredana Nistor, Amalia Hasnida,
Jingying Xu, and Pernette Bourdillon-Esteve for their constructive
feedback and assistance during the analysis of the study data.We would
also like to thank all professionals and researchers for their participation,
expertise, and suggestions on the preliminary findings of this study
during a meeting in London in April 2018.
Funding: This work was supported by theWellcome Trust (209930_
Z_17_Z), Erasmus University (through the Research Excellence and
Innovation grant), and the U.S. Pharmacopeia (USP) Quality Institute.
Competing interests: None declared.
REFERENCES
1. Mackey TK, Nayyar G. A review of existing and emerging digital
technologies to combat the global trade in fake medicines. Expert
Opin Drug Saf. 2017;16(5):587–602. CrossRef. Medline
2. Musa A, Gunasekaran A, Yusuf Y. Supply chain product visibility:
methods, systems and impacts. Expert Systems with Applications.
2014;41(1):176–194. CrossRef
3. World Health Organization (WHO) Sixty-Ninth World Health
Assembly (A69/41). Substandard/Spurious/Falsely-Labelled/
Falsified/Counterfeit Medical Products: Report by the Director-
General. WHO; 2016. Accessed July 20, 2020. http://apps.who.
int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA69/A69_41-en.pdf
4. Pisa M, McCurdy D. Improving Global Health Supply Chains
Through Traceability. Center for Global Development; 2019. Policy
paper 139. Accessed July 24, 2020. https://www.cgdev.org/sites/
default/files/improving-global-health-supply-chains-through-
traceability.pdf
5. Roth L, Nalim A, Turesson B, Krech L. Global landscape assessment
of screening technologies for medicine quality assurance: stakehold-
er perceptions and practices from ten countries. Global Health.
2018;14(1):43. CrossRef. Medline
6. Klein K, Stolk P. Challenges and opportunities for the traceability of
(biological) medicinal products. Drug Saf. 2018;41(10):911–918.
CrossRef. Medline
7. Hara L, Guirguis R, Hummel K, Villanueva M. More than bar codes:
integrating global standards-based bar code technology into na-
tional health information systems in Ethiopia and Pakistan to increase
end-to-end supply chain visibility. Glob Health Sci Pract. 2017;
5(4):678–685. CrossRef. Medline
8. Rotunno R, Cesarotti V, Bellman A, Introna V, Benedetti M. Impact of
track and trace integration on pharmaceutical production systems. Int
J Eng Bus Manag. 2014;6:25. CrossRef
9. Pisani E, Nistor AL, Hasnida A, Parmaksiz K, Xu J, Kok MO.
Identifying market risk for substandard and falsified medicines: an
analytic framework based on qualitative research in China,
Indonesia, Turkey and Romania.Wellcome Open Res. 2019;4:70.
CrossRef. Medline
10. World Health Organization (WHO).WHOGlobal Surveillance and
Monitoring System for Substandard and Falsified Medical Products.
WHO; 2017. Accessed July 20, 2020. http://www.who.int/
medicines/regulation/ssffc/publications/GSMS_Report.pdf
11. World Health Organization (WHO) Seventieth World Health
Assembly (A70/23).Member State Mechanism on Substandard/
Spurious/Falsely-Labelled/Falsified/Counterfeit Medical Products:
Report by the Director-General. WHO; 2017. Accessed July 20,
2020. http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA70/A70_
23-en.pdf
12. Cordon C, Garcia-Milà P, Vilarino TF, Caballero P. Strategy Is
Digital: How Companies Can Use Big Data in the Value Chain.
Springer International Publishing; 2016.
13. Government of Turkey. Ministry of Health (MOH). Implementing
Regulation on the Labeling, Package Leaflet and Tracing of Human
Medicinal Products. Issue number 30048. MOH; 2017. Accessed
July 20, 2020. https://titck.gov.tr/storage/legislation/NhLsfwRp.
pdf
14. Rip A, Kemp R. Technological change. In: Malone E, Rayner S, eds.
Human Choice and Climate Change, Volume 2: Resources and
Technology. Battelle Press; 1998:327–399.
15. Cresswell K, Sheikh A. Organizational issues in the implementation
and adoption of health information technology innovations: an in-
terpretative review. Int J Med Inform. 2013;82(5):e73–e86.
CrossRef. Medline
16. Hamilton WL, Doyle C, Halliwell-Ewen M, Lambert G. Public health
interventions to protect against falsified medicines: a systematic re-
view of international, national and local policies. Health Policy Plan.
2016;31(10):1448–1466. CrossRef. Medline
17. CallonM. Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication
of the scallops and the fishermen of St Brieuc Bay. The Sociological
Review. 1984;32(1 suppl):196–233. CrossRef
18. May C. Agency and implementation: understanding the embedding
of healthcare innovations in practice. Soc Sci Med. 2013;78:26–33.
CrossRef. Medline
19. Law J, Callon M. The life and death of an aircraft: a network analysis
of technical change. In: BijkerWE, Law J, eds. Shaping Technology/
Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change. The MIT Press;
1992:21–52.
20. Yin RK. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 5th ed. Sage
Publications; 2014.
21. Baxter P, Jack S. Qualitative case study methodology: study design
and implementation for novice researchers. The Qualitative Report.
2008;13(4):544–559.
22. DiCicco-Bloom B, Crabtree BF. The qualitative research interview.
Med Educ. 2006;40(4):314–321. CrossRef. Medline
23. Palinkas LA, Horwitz SM, Green CA, Wisdom JP, Duan N,
Hoagwood K. Purposeful sampling for qualitative data collection and
analysis in mixedmethod implementation research.Adm PolicyMent
Health. 2015;42(5):533–544. CrossRef. Medline
24. Government of Turkey. Ministry of Health. Turkish Medicines and
Medical Devices Agency (TMMDA). Recall Regulation. Issue No.
2953. TMMDA; 2015. Accessed July 20, 2020. https://titck.gov.tr/
storage/legislation/wRwguOgh.pdf
25. Government of Turkey. Ministry of Health (MOH). Beseri Tıbbi
€Urünler Barkod ve Karekod Uygulama Kılavuzu. MOH; 2017.
Accessed July 24, 2020. https://titck.gov.tr/storage/legislation/
eYHHQ828.PDF
Pharmaceutical Track and Trace System Implementation in Turkey www.ghspjournal.org
Global Health: Science and Practice 2020 | Volume 8 | Number 3 10
26. Government of Turkey. Ministry of Health (MOH). Ilaç Takip
Sistemi Isletme Kılavuzu. V1.03. MOH; 2009. Accessed July 24,
2020. https://www.its.gov.tr/Content/pdf/ITS_Isletme_Kilavuzu.
pdf
27. Boeije H. A purposeful approach to the constant comparative method
in the analysis of qualitative interviews.Quality & Quantity. 2002;
36(4):391–409. CrossRef
28. T.C. Saglık Bakanlıgı Tedavi Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlügü. Yataklı
Tedavi Kurumları Istatistik Yıllıgı 2000. Ministry of Health Turkey;
2001. Accessed July 24, 2020. https://dosyamerkez.saglik.gov.tr/
Eklenti/25823,2000pdf.pdf?0
29. Atun R. Transforming Turkey’s health system—lessons for universal
coverage.N Engl J Med. 2015;373(14):1285–1289. CrossRef.
Medline
30. Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu Kanunu (Number 5502). Published 2006.
Accessed July 24, 2020. https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/
2006/05/20060520-2.htm
31. €Unal Ö. Turkey implements first successful national pharmaceutical
track and trace system (ITS) for a safe and reliable supply chain. In:
GS1 Healthcare Reference Book 2015–2016. GS1; 2015:46–49.
Accessed July 24, 2020. https://www.gs1.org/sites/default/files/
docs/healthcare/gs1_healthcare_reference_book_2015-2016.pdf
32. Smith CJ. Ensuring Supply Chain Security: The Role of Anti-
Counterfeiting Technologies. UnitedNations Interregional Crime and
Justice Research Institute; 2016. Accessed July 24, 2020. http://
www.unicri.it/sites/default/files/2019-10/Ensuring_supply_
chain_security_report.pdf
33. GS1. Discussion Paper on Global Harmonization of the Traceability
System for Drugs with Globally Harmonised Barcodes. GSI; 2015.
Accessed July 24, 2020. https://www.gs1.org/sites/default/files/
docs/healthcare/gs1_global_china_ph_discussion_paper_final.pdf
34. GS1 US. 2018 Update: Implementation of DSCSA Serialization
Requirements. GS1 US; 2018. Accessed July 24, 2020. https://
www.gs1us.org/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.
aspx?Command=Core_Download&EntryId=1511&language=en-
US&PortalId=0&TabId=134
35. Kang YS, Lee YH. Development of generic RFID traceability services.
Computers in Industry. 2013;64(5):609–623. CrossRef
36. Barlas S. Track-and-trace drug verification: FDA plans new national
standards, pharmacies tread with trepidation. P T. 2011;36(4):203–
231. Medline
37. Mackey TK, Nayyar G. Digital danger: a review of the global public
health, patient safety and cybersecurity threats posed by illicit online
pharmacies. BrMed Bull. 2016;118(1):110–126. CrossRef. Medline
38. Fittler A, Bo†sze G, Botz L. Evaluating aspects of online medication
safety in long-term follow-up of 136 internet pharmacies: illegal
rogue online pharmacies flourish and are long-lived. J Med Internet
Res. 2013;15(9):e199. CrossRef. Medline
39. Buckley GJ, Gostin LO. Countering the Problem of Falsified and
Substandard Drugs. National Academies Press; 2013.
Peer Reviewed
Received: February 21, 2020; Accepted: June 16, 2020; First published online: August 19, 2020
Cite this article as: Parmaksiz K, Pisani E, Kok MO. What makes a national pharmaceutical track and trace system succeed? Lessons from Turkey.Glob
Health Sci Pract. 2020;8(3). https://doi.org/10.9745/GHSP-D-20-00084
© Parmaksiz et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0),
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are properly cited. To view a
copy of the license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. When linking to this article, please use the following permanent link: https://
doi.org/10.9745/GHSP-D-20-00084
Pharmaceutical Track and Trace System Implementation in Turkey www.ghspjournal.org
Global Health: Science and Practice 2020 | Volume 8 | Number 3 11
